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Lead: A Case Study in Interagency
Policy-Making
by Irwin H. Billick*
Exposures to low levels of lead in the environment are believed to have potentially significant
health effects, especially in children; such exposures to the general population come from many
sources. Responsibility for regulating lead exposures has been derived from a multitude of laws
passed by the Congress, and thus ultimate protection of people depends on actions taken by
several agencies of the federal government. For this reason, the history of efforts to reduce
exposures to lead is an excellent case study in the way that federal agencies do or do not work
well together. The issue ofreduction of lead in gasoline is discussed in relation to the evidence
generated by HUD concerning the relationship of blood lead in urban children in New York
City to seasonal variations in consumption of leaded gasoline in that area. Some recommenda-
tions for developing interagency cooperation in such controversies are presented.
Lead, for the most part, is a low level environ-
mental pollutant, with many possible sources and
many pathways for exposure. Part of the problem
of controlling lead is the fragmentation of respon-
sibility for regulation, not only at the Federal
level, but at the local level as well. The Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development has had
both a research and a regulatory responsibility for
a part of this complex system since 1971. The
major emphasis of this presentation will focus on
how the results of our research were used and
some of the lessons learned about interagency
cooperation and policymaking, rather than the
research itself.
After establishing the context in which we
operated, I would like to share some observations
with you on what I learned about the practical
aspects of cooperation and policy making.
One of the standard operating procedures for a
paper on lead is to point out the ubiquity of the
metal in the environment. Often the SOP is to
include a list of the lead uses, or products which
contain lead, and the transport media or pathways
of human exposure. To drive home the point a
diagram of lines, arrows, boxes, circles and num-
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bers is also included. The more complex and
unreadable this diagram is, the better. An exam-
ple ofone such diagram is shown in Figure 1 (1). It
has never been clear to me whether these dia-
grams are presented to clarify or confuse.
To add to the confusion, I have included my own
favorite version (Fig. 2) of such a diagram (2),
which has been modified by outlining some of the
areas of Federal responsibility for the control of
lead. This Balkanization of responsibility and con-
cern in both the public and private sector has been
discussed elsewhere (3, 4), but dealing with it on
an operational level is another matter.
From the regulatory point of view the problem
oflead in the environment is one ofcontrol ofrisk.
What is the risk to individuals, where does it come
from, what is an acceptable risk, how can risk be
lowered and at what cost? There are many points
in the maze that describes the lead problem where
one can enter, develop a strategy or an operational
approach. There are, for example, two extreme
approaches; either attacking the whole universe at
once, on the one extreme, or selecting a single
source, pathway, or issue, on the other extreme.
Unfortunately, from a policy point of view there
is often little choice on the part of a particular
agency where the attack can be made; it is defined
by legislative mandate, agency authority or legal
action. Usually, the entry point is at the latter
73FIGURE 1. Sources and pathways for environmental lead (1).
extreme. All one can do is take great pains to
point out the complexity of the system, put blind-
ers on and then, like a old race horse pulling a
wagon, plod forward on our appointed rounds.
A further complication arises because frequently
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little is known, either before or after standards are
set, as to the relative contribution of each particu-
lar source or pathway to the risk or what effect an
action has. This lack of knowledge may arise from
a lack of measure of risks or the inability to
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FIGURE 2. Ecodiagram showing movement of lead in the environment and areas of federal agency responsibility for control of
exposure. Modification of illustration by Goyer and Rhyne (2).
separate out a specific contribution from a global about the scientific meaning of this measure, how
measurement. adequate it is, etc., but, at least it exists. On the
In the case oflead, there is at least a measure of other hand, even if we accept that blood, lead is a
risk, the blood lead level. Arguments can be made measure of risk, at the present time both the
0 I
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ICrelative contribution of different lead exposure
sources and the pathways to the blood are un-
known.
However, all is not lost. If we can associate the
results of a specific action, for example a standard
leading to a change in lead levels in air, or
program action, such as lead paint removal, with a
change in overall blood lead, we can begin to have
confidence in our actions or possibly develop an
overall policy strategy which will be effective.
This can be illustrated by using Figure 3 (5).
For the case oflead, our measure ofriskR is mean
blood lead level, and Ri would be the change in
mean blood lead level for a specific action Si, which
has a cost Ci associated with it. Some examples of
Si included reduction of lead in gasoline; setting
air, water, or food lead standards and removal of
lead paint from housing. The overall policy strat-
egy would be one where AR/ACi, for one or
several different Si, is maximized and where the
selection of a Si produces a significant AR/ACi. An
effort should be made to address the problem at its
weakest point, or series ofweak points, where the
greatest benefit will be derived for the least cost,
in both the societal or economic sense. Such a
policy is needed now more than ever when the
demands on available resources are increasing and
one detects an increasing antiregulatory climate.
What follows is a brief description on how we at
HUD went from an narrowly focused program on
lead-based paint poisoning prevention research to
the more general program on lead hazards preven-
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FIGURE 3. Cost effectiveness of risk reduction for action Si.
Risk reduction action AR,
= change in risk for Si; ACi
=
change in cost forSi.
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tion research, what effect our research has had on
government-wide action, and finally some observa-
tions on what, I feel, are some lessons learned
about the policy research process.
The Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment was hitched to its lead-based paint wagon
in 1971 with the passage of the Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act, which defined HUD's
path, by mandating research into the nature and
extent of lead based paint poisoning in children.
Our research program was never more than a two
or three person in-house operation, with most of
our work being carried out by grants and contracts
and most of our funds spent on the other part of
the program, hazard abatement. A review and
evaluation ofthe program and how we spent eight
million dollars since 1971 is available (6). Other
agencies were given, or had due to other legisla-
tion, responsibility for control and standard set-
ting. For example, HEW has the responsibility for
a screening program to identify and treat children
with lead poisoning and the Consumer Protection
and Safety Commission was to set a safe level of
lead in paint. The Act not only mandated what we
were to do, it told us both the problem, lead-based
paint, and its solution, remove the lead-based
paint hazard.
Because ofour limited manpower resources, and
what was perceived as a limited turf, we tried to
establish formal liaison and joint projects with
those other agencies we felt had greater technical
expe'rtise. For the most part we met with limited
success. Our closest ties were with CDC/HEW
which carried out the screening grant program.
Their program funded local programs to conduct
blood lead level screening programs for children
perceived to be at greatest risk.
About 1976, five years after the Act was passed,
we began to wonder what progress, if any, had
been made in controlling lead burden in children
and if so, which programs were the most success-
ful and why. Our initial interest was to determine
what impact programs for screening and control
for lead-based paint poisoning had on changing the
risk as measured by changes in blood lead levels.
We began by looking at HEW published data and
found they were unsuitable for analysis. The data
published in the Morbidity and Mortality Reports
were too highly aggregated (e.g., no breakdown
by demographic parameters) and only reported
case finding, based on the number of children who
were lead poisoned, a definition which changed
periodically. More specifically, we wished to know
how the distribution of blood lead levels varied
with various factors such as race, age, sampling
data and if there were changes which could be
Environmental Health Perspectivesassociated with program actions, environmental
parameters or other factors.
Inquiries as to the availability of such data
yielded an almost universal response; data were
not collected at the Federal level and if such data
existed at the local level they were no good.
Fortunately, this latter observation proved to be
incorrect. Ample data exist at the local level, but
the major problem, and one which is soluble, is to
obtain the data in an analyzable form. Obtaining
such data in a clean, computer-useable format, and
with suitable documentation, has become a major
portion of our research since 1976.
Our first attempt to get useable data was
successful, and we obtained over 400,000 records
ofindividual blood lead records, on computer tape,
from New York City covering the period from
1970-76, along with some demographic informa-
tion. Analysis of this data base yielded results
which were both unexpected and inconsistent with
our legislative mandate.
Analysis of the geometric mean blood lead
disaggregated by ethnic group, age and sampling
quarter yielded results typical of that shown in
Figure 4 for 25-36 month old black and Hispanic
children. The time dependence of all of the age-
ethnic subgroups showed qualitatively the same
behavior: a long-term downward trend with a
distinct cyclical pattern. These observations seem
to indicate a more general environmental exposure
to lead than one would expect from episodic
lead-based paint ingestion or pica behavior.
The next logical step was to compare the obser-
vations on blood lead with environmental lead
35
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FIGURE 4. Variation of blood lead levels of New York City
children aged 25-36 months and air lead levels.
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measurements, the most obvious one being air
lead levels. Again the problem was to get data.
That took about six months of telephoning and
then the only air lead observations we could find
for New York City, covering the continuous seven-
year period, was from a single station 56 m above
downtown Manhattan. Preliminary analysis showed
a significant correlation between the air and blood
lead levels.
About this time, we accidently learned that
EPA was in the process of developing a criteria
document for air lead and that its Scientific Re-
view Board was meeting to review the first draft.
A letter was sent to EPA describing our findings
(7), and a presentation was given at the Board
meeting. While the technical information itselfwas
considered in the development of the final version
of the criteria document, what to us was more
important was that it was the start of our subse-
quent involvement with EPA, and other Agencies,
responsible for regulating of lead in the environ-
ment.
For our own part, we became aware ofthe much
broader universe in which we were working. We
found that others working in lead research were
completely unaware of our involvement, of our
data base and ofour analysis. That formless giant,
EPA, began to take on shape, and it soon became
apparent that even within a single Agency there
was a great deal of fragmentation, and lack of
knowledge about who was doing what and why, on
what was not perceived by us as a single environ-
mental problem. In order to cope with this frag-
mentation we made a decision aggressively to
coordinate our efforts with these of others having
responsibilities for the control of lead.
Aggressive coordination can loosely be defined a
making a pest of oneself: find out what are the
major issues, what data are available, who is
working on what and who needs what. At the
same time, you share this information with others
and also let them know what you are doing and
what relevance it has to their mission. In the long
run, it pays off.
Thus, while our immediate contact with EPA
concerned lead in air, about a year later we were
able to assist EPA on a related problem. Our
associates at EPA who had the responsibility for
setting regulations for controlling the level of lead
in gasoline, were faced with the problem of re-
justifying, in a very short time period, their
regulation for lead levels in gasoline.
The policy issue at that time (April 1979) was
that the President was seeking ways to increase
crude oil supplies and one way to do this was to
remove constraints on the use of lead in gasoline.
77An environmental regulation that was on the
books since 1973 required oil refineries to phase
down the lead content ofgasoline to a pool value of
0.5 g/gal by October 1979 (8).
The oil industry was fighting the requirement
for phasedown because unleaded gasoline is more
expensive to produce. The Energy Department
opposed the regulation on energy conservation
grounds because a barrel of oil will yield more
gallons of leaded gasoline than unleaded. A range
ofoptions for relaxing the standard, including total
repeal, were proposed and EPA was being re-
quested to justify its regulation.
Those at EPA responsible for a reply were able
to make statements that they knew where the
data to support their position existed and within a
very short time period, we jointly responded with
an analysis in a form suitable for policy decision-
making. A significant part of EPA's argument to
the Domestic Policy Staff, was the results of our
analysis: basically the two graphs shown in Figure
5 and 6. EPA, the Energy Department and the
White House Domestic Policy Staff were able to
work out a compromise to postpone the effective
date of the requirement of 0.5 g/gal for one year
with an interim level of 0.8 g/gal, on the condition
that refineries immediately increase their yield of
unleaded gasoline. According to one write-up of
this whole process, White House officials were
quoted (8) as saying "We were able to say to the
President that lead has very serious effects on
poor kids in the inner cities. Without the analysis
the decision would never have been made."
This saga does not imply that the policy issue
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FIGURE 5. Variation of blood lead levels of New York City
children aged 25-36 months and gasoline lead consumption.
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was decided on the basis of our findings alone,
other issues are involved, but it was one of the
rare instances where we have documentation of
how the process worked from the collection of data
through the policy decision. Also it does not mean
the decision is final. Since there is still some
debate about going from 0.8 g/gal to 0.5 g/gal by
fall of 1980, the whole process is starting over
again.
For one who has been in and out of the so called
science policy game, an ability to follow actual
scientific research and see its direct influence on
policy is a very heady experience. I feel that a
number of lessons were learned that can contrib-
ute to the successful practice of policy research
and interagency cooperation and coordination. These
are summarized as follows.
(1) Understand and appreciate the complexity of
the system you are operating in. Then look for
places where the most can be accomplished for the
least cost.
(2) Be concerned about the problem, not about
turf. This is particularly true in a pervasive
environmental problem such as lead.
(3) Above all, get the data. The state of the art
of determining impact or policy is restrained only
by the data. The projections are only as good as
the data base (9).
(4) More data exist than you think. They are
buried, a little difficult to get, but they are there.
For the most part people are delighted to share
them with you and want their work to be appreci-
ated and used.
(5) Establish informal networks. Find out who is
doing what, what their needs are, what the issues
are, who's putting on the pressure and offer to
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10 I -I :--- -- -r -.--------help. Let them know what you have and how it
may help them. Formal coordinating groups are
fine to find out who's who, but not for doing work.
(6) The higher up the policy ladder you go, the
shorter should be your presentation of results.
Sophisticated analysis is needed for backup, but a
simple graph has more meaning to a policymaker
than a regression analysis.
The observations and opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the author and in no way reflect the position of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development or other
Agencies or elements of Federal government.
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